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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue presented 
Did the facts and allegations underlying the claims of James Fennell against Ed 
Green and Ed Green Construction, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Green") 
give rise to State Farm Fire & Casualty Company's and State Farm General Insurance 
Company's (hereinafter collectively referred to as "State Farm") duty to investigate the 
claims and defend Green. The trial court determined that such a duty did exist and that 
State Farm breached that duty when it failed to defend Green and granted summary 
judgment. 
Standard of review 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). This court should review the trial court's Order granting Summary Judgment to 
Green for Correctness, giving no deference to its legal conclusions. Calhoun v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 56,111, 96 P.3d 916 (citing Prince v. Bear River 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, f 14, 56 P.3d 524). Furthermore, all facts and reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from those facts should be viewed in the light that is most 
1 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Khalsa v. Ward, 2004 UT App 393,15,101 P.3d 843 
(citing Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130,113, 63 P.3d 705). 
Additionally, the trial court's interpretation of an insurance contract is also a legal 
determination and should be reviewed for correctness. Pacific American Const, v. 
Security Union Title, 1999 UT 87, f 4, 987 P.2d 45 (citing AOK Lands, Inc. v. Shand, 
Morahan & Co., 860 P.2d 924, 925 (Utah 1993)). Nevertheless, insurance policy 
language should be construed "liberally in favor of the insured [] so as to promote and 
not defeat the purposes of insurance." Estate of Berkemeir ex rel. Nielsen v. Hartford 
Ins. Co. of Midwest, 2003 UT App 78, f 6,67 P.3d 1012; (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. 
v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993)). "Policy provisions that limit or exclude 
coverage should be strictly construed against the insurer and must be interpreted and 
construed as an ordinary purchaser of insurance would understand it." Id. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
The above issue was preserved below by the filing of cross motions for summary 
judgment and the subsequent granting of Green's Motion for Summary Judgment 
declaring that the facts and circumstances underlying Fennell's claims gave rise to State 
Farm's duty to defend and that its failure to do so was a breach of the obligations it owed 
to Green. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This matter involves Green's claims that State Farm committed a bad faith breach 
of its duties to investigate, evaluate, settle and defend him from claims asserted against 
him by James Fennell, II ("Fennell") for damages caused by a landslide on Fennell's 
property. State Farm conducted some investigation and provided Green with a defense 
for a very short period of time, but abandoned that defense three and one half months 
after Fennell filed a lawsuit in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, State 
of Utah ("the Fennell Litigation"). 
In the Fennell Litigation Green and his co-defendants were granted summary 
judgment. This Court affirmed that summary judgment in a decision reported as Fennell 
v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, 77 P.3d 339. (R. 154-59). Prior to the resolution of the 
Fennell Litigation, Green filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah seeking declaratory relief and compensation for State Farm's 
bad faith breach of its duties to investigate, evaluate and defend him from Fennell's 
claims. 
After the appellate court decision upheld the summary judgment granted to Green, 
both State Farm and Green filed motions for summary judgment in the bad faith claim 
Green was pursuing against State Farm. Judge Stephen L. Henroid granted Green's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denied State Farm's motion. This appeal followed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1992, Green and a partner, Neil Wall ("Wall") were involved in the 
development and subdivision of land in Layton, Utah for residential purposes. Fennell 
v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, f 2, 77 P.3d 339. (R. 49). They hired Glen R. Maughan to 
evaluate the condition of the soil and provide a soils report. Maughan's report indicated 
a possible landslide problem due to the undercutting by the creek. Id. They then worked 
with Bill Flanders, an engineer for Layton City, to determine what needed to be done to 
the land. Flanders required them to level "off the grade [of the property] to improve 
runoff and cause less stress..." Id. at f 2, (R. 49-50; 286-87). Flanders received and 
reviewed the soils report and approved the work that had been done on the property "and 
determined that Green and Wall had complied with all of the necessary regulations and 
standards to gain approval from Layton City for the Falcon Ridge Subdivision.' 
Subsequently, Layton City approved the subdivision for residential building." Id at f 2, 
(R. 154). 
In May of 1995, Fennell contracted with GMW Development, Inc. dba Ivory 
North ("Ivory North") for the purchase and construction of a home on Lot 31 of the 
Falcon Ridge Subdivision. Id atf 3, (R. 154-55). Ivory North then acquired Lot 31 lot 
from Green and Wall, built a home on it, and transferred title to Fennell on December 
22, 1995. Id. Green and Wall did not ever have any direct contact with Fennell until 
after the claims at the heart of this litigation arose. Id. 
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On April 17,1998, a landslide occurred on Lot 31(R.4 ^[19,51113,231,234,236, 
278-80; 287) and a year later, in April of 1999, attorney Lavar E. Stark, representing 
Fennell filed a notice of claims with the Mayor and City Council of Layton City for 
"damages incurred as a result of the landslides on or about the 17th day of April, 1998 
and thereafter," at Fennell's home. (R. 231-32). 
On June 11,1999, attorney Stark sent Green and Wall a letter advising them that 
the back of Fennell's lot near the house "started sliding away. As a result the lot was 
substantially destroyed and the home and lot rendered valueless." (R. 234). Shortly 
thereafter Green and Wall, through their attorney J. Scott Buehler, disputed Fennell's 
claims and asserted that the landslide suffered by Fennell "was unforeseeable in light of 
the thorough engineering that was undertaken prior to marketing the lots." (R. 236). 
Buehler's letter acknowledged the duty of developers to "meet certain requisite standards 
and engineering principles imposed by both the municipality and the construction 
industry" but claimed that Wall and Green "had not breached any recognizable standard 
of duty which would impose liability upon them for the slippage." Id. 
At the time of the landslide, Green was being protected by a contractor/builder's 
risk insurance policy issued by State Farm. That policy included coverages for business 
personal property; business liability; medical payments; and products completed 
operations, ("the Policy"). (R. 218; 12-46; 194-227). 
The Policy, among other things, required State Farm to pay those sums that 
5 
[Green] becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, 
property damage, personal injury or advertising injury to which th[e] insurance 
applies1. (R. 27). 
The insurance applied to claims of "bodily injury or property damage [physical 
injury to or destruction of tangible property, including all loss of use] caused by an 
occurrence [accident] which takes place in the coverage territory during the policy 
period." Id. 
The Policy also obligated State Farm to defend Green from any "claimfs] or 
suit[s] seeking damages payable under the policy..." The duty to defend language in the 
Policy states: 
[State Farm] will have the right and duty to defend any 
claim or suit seeking damages payable under this policy 
even though the allegations of the suit may be groundless, 
false or fraudulent. The amount we will pay for damages is 
limited as described in Limits of Insurance. Damages 
because of bodily injury include damages claimed by any 
person or organization for care, loss of services or death 
resulting at any time from the bodily injury. We may 
investigate and settle any claim or suit at our discretion. 
Our right and duty to defend ends when we have used up 
the applicable limit of insurance in the payment of 
judgments or settlements or medical expenses." 
(R. 27; 208). 
On October 11,1999, Buehler tendered defense of Fennell's claims to State Farm 
1
 The Policy provides definitions for the terms set forth in bold face type. 
and provided State Farm with copies of all correspondence he had regarding those 
claims. (R. 238)2. 
State Farm began to investigate Fennell's claims and on December 7, 1999, its 
claims representative, Alan Campbell ("Campbell") indicated that he wanted to meet 
with Flanders (the Layton City engineer that had approved the building permit) "because 
he [would] be able to help establish a % of negligence based on what went on." 
Campbell also expressed a need to "discuss with house counsel as to potential liability 
on this matter to get there (sic) viewpoint on negligence." (R. 282) (emphasis added). 
On March 7,2000, Campbell reported that he had "determined we do have some 
exposure on this matter as prior landslide problems were apparent and soils report 
indicates further testing needed but was never done." His report also indicated he would 
"make offer of settlement based on our % [and had] evaluated our portion at 30-40%." 
(R. 283). 
No settlement was ever reached and on April 7, 2000, Fennell filed a complaint 
against Green, Wall and Ivory North for damages to his property caused by the landslide 
in April of 1998 ("the Fennell Litigation"). (R.4118; 48-57; 108-135). 
On May 11, 2000, Linda Henrie, State Farm's Fire Team Manager ("Henrie"), 
2
 Pages 231-240 of the record were provided by Green to State Farm as part of his Initial 
Disclosures and State Farm has and produced copies of some of those notices and information 
regarding its investigation in its Initial Disclosures at R. 278-296. In the instant case, however, 
discovery regarding exactly what State Farm knew was curtailed by the grant of Summary 
Judgment. Consequently, additional information possessed by State Farm was never obtained. 
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advised Green that State Farm had retained attorney Paul Belnap to defend him from 
Fennell's claims, but indicated that "we specifically reserve our right to deny coverage 
to you [] for the following reasons:" 
1. It is questionable as to whether this lawsuit involves bodily 
injury, property damage, personal injury or advertising 
injury caused by an occurrence. 
2. It is questionable as to whether this lawsuit involves bodily 
injury or property damage expected or intended from the 
standpoint of an insured. 
3. It is questionable as to whether this lawsuit involves bodily 
injury or property damage to any person or property 
which is the result of willful and malicious acts of an 
insured. 
4. It is questionable as to whether this lawsuit involves 
property damage to your work arising out of it or any part 
of it and included in the products-completed operation 
hazard. 
5. The Contractor's Policy does not afford coverage for 
punitive or exemplary damages. 
(R. 59-60; 245-49). 
A May 25,2000, letter from Henrie to Belnap included the following information 
regarding the facts and circumstances obtained by State Farm and underlying Fennell's 
claims: 
Ed Green and Neil Wall of Devcor entered into an agreement to be the 
developers of a particular land project located in the eastern section of 
Layton, Utah. They secured 12 acres then contacted the City which 
required them to obtain a soil report, which they did from Glen Maughan, 
a soils engineer. It was his opinion that the property was suitable for 
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building with the exception of Lot 21. At this particular time, the lots 
were numbered differently. Lot 21 represents the current Lot 31, which 
is the plaintiff's property. In Mr. Maughan's report, he indicates: 
Lots 1-20 and 22-39, with the exception of Lot 21, are 
covered by this report. It is recommended that further 
drilling be performed on Lot 21 in order to determine what 
has caused the sloughing north of Lot 21. This was 
undertaken because of evidence of a previous landslide that 
took place on that particular lot. 
This report was submitted to the City. Alan Campbell questioned Mr. 
Green with regard to additional testing conducted on Lot 21, wherein the 
insured indicated that he did not know. Mr. Green stated that he worked 
with Bill Flanders, the City engineer, and that he required the insured to 
level off the grade in order to improve the runoff and cause less stress on 
the hillside on Lot 21. It is the insured's position that he and Mr. Wall 
satisfied everything that Layton City required of them. They were issued 
building rights by the City to develop the property and sell the land. 
Mr. Maughan submitted a supplemental report, dated October 9, 1992, 
which states that he reviewed the landslide area on Lot 21 and found it to 
have been caused by the undercutting of the bank by Kays Creek. Mr. 
Maughan suggested a road right-of-way be built to this property and 
advised that the slope to Kays Creek would need to be reduced to 30 
degrees in order to prevent further landslides. 
The insured and Neil Wall proposed to the City that a roadway be built in 
the area of the landslide and that they build the home 20-30 feet to the 
north of that particular area, in order that there would be no concern about 
landfall. The City, however, did not approve the insured's proposal, 
therefore, the roadway was placed elsewhere and the home was build 
directly over the landslide area. 
In the spring of 1998, the Wasatch area experienced significant rainfall. 
It was during this time period that the landslide on the plaintiff's property 
occurred. 
(R. 286-87). Henrie also indicated in that letter that "no damages were [being] claimed 
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for physical property damage to the home, however, there is significant damage to the 
plaintiff's landscaping." (R. 288) (emphasis added). 
Henrie's letter to Belnap also contained a section entitled "ANALYSIS OF 
LIABILITY" which stated: 
As a builder, the insured would owe a common-law duty of ordinary care, 
to perform his work in a workmanlike manner, adhering to any 
requirements imposed upon him by the City of Layton. The insured's duty 
in this situation is one of reasonable care, not to subject the property 
owner or anyone else to any unreasonable risk of harm or danger. The 
Utah Supreme Court has found that a builder or contractor can be liable 
to either the property owner or a third person for a breach of that duty, but 
has specifically limited the contractor's liability where he has merely 
followed a set of plans and specifications which were provided to him. It 
is crucial to this limitation that the plans and specifications themselves did 
not make the dangerous condition obvious to the contractor so that a 
reasonable contractor would not have followed the plans. Also, a 
contractor's liability is superceded by that of the property owner if it can 
be shown that the owner knew of the dangerous condition created but did 
nothing about it. 
We believe that there is a possibility the insured has breached his duties 
in this situation. If he had taken the time to read his own reports from his 
own experts, he would have seen that Lot 21 was not suitable for building. 
Other arrangements could have been made to insure that the plaintiff's 
home was not built in a landfall area. 
The insured's response is that he took all necessary precautions and 
adhered to all requirements imposed on him by the City and that the City 
issued permission for them to develop and sell the land "as is." As we 
discussed in our recent Phase I conference, it appears at this point, the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries are due to his failure to mitigate 
same as well as the breach of duty on the part of our insured, Neil Wall 
and the City. 
(R. 288-89). 
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Belnap began to defend Green, but State Farm withdrew its defense three and a 
half months later on September 6, 2000, when Henrie sent Green a letter indicating that 
State Farm would no longer defend him from Fennell's claims because they were not 
covered by the Policy. (R. 62-63; 251-52). 
State Farm's denial of coverage and withdrawal of its defense was based on the 
following Policy language: 
COVERAGE L - BUSINESS LIABILITY 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay 
as damages because of bodily injury, property damage, personal injury 
or advertising injury to which this insurance applies. No other obligation 
or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered unless 
explicitly provided for under Supplementary Payments. This insurance 
applies only: 
1. to bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence 
which takes place in the coverage territory during the policy 
period; 
2. to personal injury caused by an occurrence committed in the 
coverage territory during the policy period; 
3. to advertising injury caused by an occurrence committed in the 
coverage territory during the policy period. 
Id. Henrie's letter to Green did not provide any explanation of why Fennell's claims 
were not encompassed by the policy language cited, but simply concluded that because 
"the allegations in the complaint do not fall within the language of the insuring 
agreement, we must therefore deny defense and indemnity for this claim." (R. 63). 
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The Fennell litigation continued and Green paid for his own defense. On March 
26, 2002, Ed Green filed the Complaint at the heart of this Appeal in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County alleging bad faith and breach of contract by State 
Farm for its refusal to defend or indemnify him. (R. 1-10). 
On December 5,2001, the judge in the Fennell litigation granted Green's, Wall's 
and Ivory North's motions for summary judgment and dismissed Fennell's claims against 
them. The trial court's decision granting summary judgment for Green and the others 
(and ultimately this Court's decision affirming the trial court) found that summary 
judgment in that case was appropriate because Fennell had failed to controvert any facts 
or set forth any facts which Fennell claimed were disputed, as required by Rule 4-
501(2)(B), Utah R. Jud. Admin, (amended November 2001). This Court's decision 
affirming that summary judgement is reported as Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, 
77 P.3d 339. (R. 154-59). 
That decision found that: 
[g]iven the uncontroverted facts, we determine that Fennell's fraudulent 
non-disclosure claim against Wall and Green fails because there were no 
facts presented to show that Wall or Green knew of a possible landslide 
condition on Lot 31. Indeed, such knowledge was refuted by Maughan, 
who conducted the required soils report of Lot 31 stated in his deposition 
that he did not believe that Lot 31 was a landslide area. 
M a t 111. 
The following is an excerpt of the geologist Maughan's deposition testimony that 
this Court used to support the above conclusion: 
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Q. And from that observation and opinion that you've made, you 
determined that this was not a slide are but just an undercut by the creek, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Id. (R. 156). This Court held that "[b]ecause Fennell cannot establish that Wall and 
Green had knowledge of any such information [regarding a possible landslide on Lot 
31], it necessarily follows that there [could] be no duty to disclose the information to 
either Ivory North or Fennell." (Id. at ffl 11 and 12). 
Regarding Fennell's claim for negligent non-disclosure, this Court held that: 
Fennell's claim for recovery for negligent non-disclosure is barred by the 
economic loss rule because 'economic damages are not recoverable in 
negligence absent physical property damage or bodily injury.' [ ] Similar 
to the homeowners in American Towers Fennell did not have a contractual 
relationship with Wall and Green; thus, the economic loss rule applies to 
prevent the imposition of 'economic expectations' on non-contracting 
parties. [ ]. Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting Wall's and 
Green's motions for summaryjudgment as to Fennell's claims of negligent 
misrepresentation." American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI 
Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1189 and 1192 (Utah, 1996) (footnotes 
omitted). 
(R. 154-59, |15; See also ff 13 and 14). 
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment in the instant case were then filed (R. 88-
159; 172-252; 265-96), and on August 24, 2004, the trial court granted Ed Green's 
Motion for Summary Judgment against State Farm. (R. 300-01). A petition to file an 
Interlocutory Appeal was then filed (R. 302-03) and accepted by this Court (R. 309). 
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Because the trial court had determined to resolve coverage separately from 
damages, Green's damages for State Farm's bad faith failure to defend him have not yet 
been established. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
STATE FARM HAD A DUTY TO DEFEND GREEN 
An insurance company's duty to defend is separate from and broader than its duty 
to indemnify and may exist even if the insurer is ultimately not liable for 
indemnification. Fire Ins, Exchange v. Estate ofTherkelsen, 2001 UT 48,521,27 P.3d 
555 (citing Sharon Steel Corp, v, Aetna Cas, and Sur, Co,, 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 
1997)). In addition to the duty to defend, the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires 
"at the very least that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to 
determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act 
promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim." Beck v. Farmers Ins, 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). The duty to defend "arises when the insurer 
ascertains facts giving rise to potential liability under the insurance policy." Sharon 
Steel, 931 P.2d at 133 (citing Deseret Federal Sav, & Loan Assyn v. U. S, Fidelity & 
Guar. Co,, 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986)). 
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STATE FARM'S DUTY TO DEFEND GREEN SHOULD BE 
RESOLVED BY CONSTRUING AND RESOLVING ALL FACTS, 
CIRCUMSTANCES, ALLEGATIONS AND CONFLICTS IN FAVOR 
OF INSURANCE 
Potential liability is determined by reference to the facts and allegations 
underlying the plaintiff's claims. Id. When a complaint alleges a cause of action which 
may fall within the coverage of the policy, the insurer is obligated to defend. 
Unionamerica Ins. Co. Ltd. v. J. B. Johnson, 806 A.2d 431, 433 (Pa. Super. 2002) 
(citations omitted). All allegations should be taken as true and should be liberally 
construed in favor of the insured. Id. (citing Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 
152 A.2d 484 (Pa. 1959). Additionally, all reasonable inferences from the facts and 
allegations should also be resolved in favor of the insured. Doyle v. Engelke, 580 N.W. 
2d 245,248 (Wis. 1998). If coverage is not clear from the face of the complaint but may 
nonetheless exist, the insurer must investigate the claim and give the insured the benefit 
of the doubt in determining whether the insurer has a duty to defend. Holly Mountain 
Resources, Ltd. v. Westport Ins. Corp., 104 P.3d 725 (Wash. 2005) (citing Truck Ins. 
Exch. v. Vanport Homes, Inc., 58 P.3d 276 (Wash. 2002)). An insurer may be required 
to consider facts outside the complaint if "(a) the allegations are in conflict with facts 
known to or readily ascertainable by the insurer or (b) the allegations of the complaint 
are ambiguous or inadequate." Id. (citations omitted). 
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THE FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES AND ALLEGATIONS 
UNDERLYING FENNELL'S CLAIMS BROUGHT THEM WITHIN 
THE COVERAGE PROMISED BY STATE FARM 
In this case, Fennell's claims and the information known to or ascertainable by 
State Farm required it to provide Green with a defense. Its failure to do so constituted 
a bad faith breach of the duty it owned to Green. 
State Farm issued Green a "Builders' Risk Policy" and promised to pay those 
sums that Green became legally obligated to pay as damages because of property 
damage caused by an occurrence in the coverage territory during the policy period. 
(R. 27). 
State Farm claimed that it did not have to defend Green because the landslide and 
the damages it caused did not fall within the Policy's definition of "property damage" 
and because Fennell's damages were not the result of an "occurrence" as that term is 
used in the Policy. (See State Farm's Brief). State Farm's position, however, is refuted 
by the facts known to or ascertainable by State Farm, as reflected in: State Farm's 
investigation materials; this Court's decision in Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App. 291; 
and the claims asserted by Fennell. Numerous facts, allegations and information 
demonstrate that Fennell sought to recover for damages to his property that were 
accidental, unplanned, unintended and not reasonably foreseeable. State Farm's own 
adjuster recognized and acknowledged that "there is significant damage to [Fennell's] 
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landscaping (R.288) and that Green believed he and Wall had done everything necessary 
to prevent the hill from sliding." (R. 288). 
BECAUSE FENNELL'S CLAIMS AGAINST GREEN INCLUDED 
PROPERTY DAMAGE CAUSED BY AN OCCURRENCE, STATE 
FARM HAD A DUTY TO DEFEND GREEN 
While the Utah Supreme Court found the representations in Nova Casualty v. 
Able Const, 1999 UT 69,983 P.2d 575, were intentional, produced expected or intended 
results and not covered by the policy issued in that case, not every claim of negligent 
misrepresentation requires proof of intent. The Utah Supreme Court has explained that 
"[i]ndeed, by its very terms, negligent representation does NOT require the intentional 
mental state necessary to establish fraud." Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins Brown & 
Gunnell Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 n.2 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). 
In this case, both Green and State Farm recognized that Green had a duty to 
exercise reasonable care and take reasonable steps to not subject Fennell to an 
unreasonable risk of harm or danger. (R. 236 and 288-89). Fennell's claim that an 
alleged breach of that duty by Green resulted in the landslide which damaged his 
property is a perfect example of a negligence claim which should have been covered by 
the Policy. 
State Farm has improperly attempted to limit the Court's evaluation to the causes 
of action asserted in the Complaint. That attempt ignores important facts and the Policy 
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language that extended State Farm's duty to defend Green to "any claim or suit seeking 
damages..." (R. 27 and 208) (emphasis added). 
Fennell's Complaint included allegations that Green breached duty to exercise 
reasonable care and take reasonable steps necessary to prevent the landslide that 
occurred. Fennell claimed that "at all relevant times, defendants knew or should have 
known through the exercise of reasonable care and using appropriate testing methods and 
reviewing available geological data, that Lot 31 was the site of a natural geological area 
subject to landslides and erosion. Defendants Green and Wall knew that the lot was 
unstable and that the geologist recommended a road right-of-way be placed on Lot 31 
to address and mitigate the landslide and erosion problem. 
The facts in this case refute rather than support State Farm's contention that there 
is no coverage because Fennell's damages were expected or unintended. This Court 
found that there was no evidence submitted in the Fennell litigation that Green had 
knowledge of a possible landslide, Fennell, 2003 UT at H 11 and 12, and State Farm 
acknowledged that Green, and those working with him, believed they had taken all 
precautions necessary to make the property safe (R. 288-89). Any inference or 
assumption that Green should have expected a landslide to occur is insufficient to relieve 
State Farm from its duty to defend Green. Furthermore, whether Green expected or 
intended a landslide to occur is a question of fact that cannot be resolved in a summary 
judgment, and while the ultimate answer to that question might preclude coverage, the 
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very fact that it is a question of fact requires State Farm to defend Green from the 
Fennell's claims at the heart of this case. 
THE INADVERTENT MISTAKES THAT LEAD TO FENNELL'S 
CLAIMS REQUIRED STATE FARM TO DEFEND GREEN 
While breaches of contract are not covered by the Policy, inadvertent mistakes by 
Green, Wall, Maughan or others should be covered. Federated Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Grapevine Excavation, Inc., 197 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. Tex. 1999). Any mistakes 
attributable to Green or those affiliated with him in this case were inadvertent and 
accidental, thereby bringing them within the coverage of the Policy. 
NO EXCLUSION RELIEVES STATE FARM'S OBLIGATION TO 
DEFEND GREEN 
There are no exclusions that State Farm can rely on to justify its failure to defend 
Green. State Farm first raised the professional services exclusion after it had already 
withdrawn its defense and had been sued by Green for its bad faith refusal to defend. 
Its failure to rely on that exclusion when it elected to abandon its defense should 
preclude it from relying on that exclusion now. Once an insurer abandons its defense it 
is no longer entitled to claim lack of coverage as a reason for not defending. Because 
State Farm did not base its decision to withdraw its defense on the professional services 
exclusion, its attorney should not be allowed to justify the insurance company's decision 
by reliance on that exclusion now. Finally, because there is no evidence that Green 
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intended or expected the landslide to occur, State Farm cannot escape its duty to defend 
Green from Fennell's claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STATE FARM'S DUTY TO INVESTIGATE FENNELL'S 
CLAIMS AND DEFEND GREEN AROSE FROM THE 
FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES AND ALLEGATIONS 
UNDERLYING FENNELL'S CLAIMS 
A. Because the Duty to Defend is Broad and Vital to Provide 
the Benefits of Insurance, All Inferences, Allegations, 
Facts and Doubts Should be Construed in Favor Of 
Insurance and the Insured 
"An insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify. Its defense 
duty arises when the insurer ascertains facts giving rise to potential liability under the 
insurance policy." Sharon Steel, 931 P.2d at 133 (citing Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Assoc, 714 P.2d at 1146). The covenant in an insurance policy requiring the insurer to 
defend an insured imposes upon the insurer a fiduciary responsibility to act in good faith 
and zealously protect its insureds interests as it would its own. Ammerman v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 430 P.3d 576,578-79 (Utah 1967). Before an insurer can refuse to defend an 
insured it must make a good faith determination "based on all the facts known to it, or 
which by reasonable efforts could be discovered by it, that there is no potential liability 
under the policy." Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 714 P.2d at 1147 (citations 
omitted). See also Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Staples, 2004 MT 108, <[20-22, 90 
P.3d 381 (citations omitted) (holding that the duty to defend arises when an insurer has 
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received notice of facts that represent a covered risk under the policy). Absolute 
freedom from coverage only occurs when "there are no disputed facts which, if proved 
by the plaintiff at trial, would result in liability under the policy." Id. 
The duty to defend can in some instances be more important to the insured than 
the duty to indemnify. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Vanport Homes, Inc., 58 P.3d 276, 282 
(Wash. 2002). The refusal to defend can expose an insured to business failure and 
bankruptcy. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "[a]n insured faces potentially 
catastrophic consequences if funds are not available to pay for a loss or a defense from 
claims." Beck, 701 P.2d at 802 (citing Reichert v. General Ins. Co., 428 P.2d 860, 864 
(Cal. 1967), (vacated on other grounds) 442 P.2d 377(Cal. 1968)). The Beck decision 
also notes that "it is axiomatic that insurance frequently is purchased not only to provide 
funds in case of loss, but to provide peace of mind for the insured or his beneficiaries." 
Id. Consequently, the duty to defend has to be evaluated and determined in good faith 
with all ambiguities and questions being resolved in favor of the insured. 
Just like coverage questions, when determining whether or not an insurer has a 
duty to defend its insured, the facts and allegations must be taken as true and if a 
complaint has been filed it should be liberally construed with all doubts and inferences 
about whether claims fall within the coverage being resolved in favor of the insured. 
Unionamerica Ins. Co. Ltd. v. J. B. Johnson, 806 A.2d 431, 434 (Pa. 2002) (citing 
Cadwalladerv. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 152A.2d484(Pa. 1959)). Where there is any 
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doubt as to whether the duty to defend exists, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the 
insured and against the insurer. Borg v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 41 Cal.App.4th 448, 
455,54 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 (1996) (citations omitted). See also Uhrich v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., 109 Cal.App.4th 598, 608, 135 Cal.Rptr.2cl 131 (2003) (ambiguities are 
construed in favor of the insured); Doyle, 580 N.W. 2d at 248 (we liberally construe the 
allegations in the complaint and assume all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
insured); and Holly Mountain Resources Ltd., 104 P.3d at 731 (an insurer has a duty to 
defend when the facts, construed liberally, could impose liability on the insured). 
The duty to defend must be reviewed in light of the coverage and protections 
promised by the policy. There is a strong policy in favor of liberal construction of 
insurance policy language in favor of the insured to "accomplish the purpose for which 
the insurance was taken out and for which the premium was paid." Farmers Ins. Exch. 
v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, f24, 99 P.3d 796 (quoting Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. 
Soc'y, 72 P.2d 1060, 1073 (Utah, 1937)). 
B. State Farm Cannot Ignore the Facts and Allegations it 
was Aware of bv Hiding Behind the Four Corners of the 
Complaint. 
State Farm attempts to avoid its defense obligations by ignoring the facts and 
circumstances underlying Fennell's claims it learned about through its investigation and 
by hiding behind a very narrow interpretation of the allegations in Fennell's complaint. 
(State Farm Brief at 16-24). The obligation of good faith requires "at the very least that 
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an insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a claim 
is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in 
rejecting or settling the claim." Beck, 701 P.2d at 801 (citations omitted). State Farm's 
decision whether or not to defend Green should have been based upon all the information 
it had that indicated the claims may be covered. While it may be improper for an insurer 
to base a denial of coverage on facts and allegations outside of a complaint, an insurer 
should not be allowed to completely ignore facts, circumstances and allegations that it 
knows of that may bring a particular claim or loss within the promised coverage. 
State Farm's failure to use, recognize or acknowledge the information it obtained 
in this case to resolve the coverage issue constitutes bad faith, as a matter of law. Even 
if the only information State Farm had regarding this matter was Fennell's complaint, 
it should be found in breach of its obligations of good faith related to the investigation 
and evaluation of those claims. Insurers should not be permitted to avoid the duty to 
defend by ignoring the facts that they know about or should know about. Allowing an 
insurer to ignore facts and refuse to defend would incentivize insurance companies to 
ignore the duty to investigate. Requiring insurers to base their coverage decisions on the 
facts they know about or should know about, on the other hand, would increase the 
likelihood that insureds would receive the benefits of a defense when it is needed. The 
specific facts giving rise to State Farm's duty to defend Green from Fennell's claims are 
dealt with below. 
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C. State Farm is Bound by the Facts and Conclusions Found 
in the Fennell Litigation. 
State Farm's duty to defend Green also arises from the facts and conclusions 
reached in the Fennell litigation that support a finding of coverage and a duty to defend. 
In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir. 1993), 
an insurer that refused to participate in the defense of a claim was barred from contesting 
the reasonableness of a settlement reached without its participation. Id. at 1558. The 
Utah Supreme Court recently held that "as a general rule [,] when an insurer, whose 
policy requires it to defend its insured, receives notice of a suit against [the insured] and 
is allowed an opportunity to defend, but refuses, [the insurer] is bound by the findings 
and judgment therein." Spews v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, |52, 98 P.3d 28; (quoting 
McCarty v. Parks, 564 P.2d 1122, 1123 (Utah 1977)). In the instant case, State Farm 
had an obligation and duty to investigate Fennell's claims and defend Green. It should 
not, therefore, be permitted to deny the facts and conclusions established in the 
underlying litigation that support a conclusion of coverage. 
D. State Farm's Duty to Defend Arose From All Covered 
Claims Not Just Those Included in Fennell's Complaint. 
State Farm's attempt to avoid its duty to defend Green by relying on the "four 
corners of the complaint" conflicts with its obligations under the Policy and Utah's 
reliance upon Notice Pleading. Under the right and duty to defend provisions of the 
Policy, State Farm had "the right and duty to defend any CLAIM or suit seeking 
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damages payable under the policy...." (R. 27) (emphasis on "claim" added). State Farm, 
therefore, was required to defend Green from any claim seeking damages payable under 
the Policy, not just those asserted in the complaint. When Fennell's claims are viewed 
in light of the facts known to and ascertainable by State Farm and in the light most 
favorable to Green, State Farm's duty to defend Green becomes clear. 
Fennell claimed Green was responsible for creating and/or allowing the 
conditions which resulted in the landslide that damaged his property to exist. State Farm 
ignores the nature of those claims and argues that it did not have to defend Green 
because he did not do anything that caused the landslide. That argument, however, 
totally ignores the obligation Green had to take steps that would have prevented the 
landslide from occurring. Green, Maughan, Wall and Flanders all took the steps they felt 
were needed to prevent a landslide. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight Fennel claimed 
that their efforts were inadequate and allowed the landslide to occur. Green's failure to 
take or require some action that would have prevented the landslide could have exposed 
him to a claim for negligence. That exposure required State Farm to defend him. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently affirmed that: 
In order to protect unsophisticated purchasers, [ ] a developer, subdivider 
or person performing similar tasks has 'a duty to exercise reasonable care 
to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type 
of ordinary, average dwelling house, and he must disclose to his purchaser 
any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the 
subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building.' 
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Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55,116,94 R3d 919 (quoting Loveland v. Or em City Corp., 
746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987)). The facts and allegations at the heart of Fennell's 
claims, if true, could have exposed Green to a judgment for a breach of those duties. 
State Farm also recognized that Fennell's claims included allegations of 
negligence. State Farm's own adjuster, Alan Campbell, reported that he was meeting 
with the Layton City Engineer in order to help "establish a % of negligence and wanted 
to discuss the matter "with house counsel as to potential liability on this matter to get 
there (sic) viewpoint on negligence." (R. 282) (emphasis added). Later, Campbell 
indicated that he intended to make a settlement offer based upon Green's percentage of 
fault estimated to be at between 30-40%. (R. 283). Linda Henrie, also recognized 
Green's duty to use ordinary care in preparing the lot and acknowledged that he could 
be liable for a breach of that duty. (R. 288-89). She reported there was a "possibility 
[that Green] breached his duties in this situation," and recognized that other steps may 
have been taken that could have prevented the problem. Id. Perhaps most importantly 
Henrie wrote that "the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries are [sic] due to 
[plaintiff's] failure to mitigate same as well as the breach of duty on the part of our 
insured, Neil Wall and the City." Id. 
Because the facts, circumstances, allegations and information known to and 
obtainable by State Farm included claims that could come within coverage of the policy, 
State Farm had a duty to defend Green. Its failure to provide that defense was a breach 
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of its contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing and constitutes bad faith as a matter 
of law. The trial court, therefore, was correct in ruling that State Farm had an obligation 
to defend and protect Green from Fennell's claims. 
II. STATE FARM'S DUTY TO DEFEND GREEN IS CLEAR 
WHEN THE FACTS, CIRCUMSTANCES AND 
ALLEGATIONS UNDERLYING FENNELL'S CLAIMS 
ARE COMPARED TO THE COVERAGE PROMISED BY 
THE POLICY 
The Policy involved in this case was a Contractors/Builder's Risk Policy. (R. 12-
16). The indemnity and defense provisions of that policy are separate, distinct and 
unrelated. The Policy declares, "[State Farm] will have the right and duty to defend any 
CLAIM or suit seeking damages payable under this policy even though the allegations 
of the suit may be groundless, false or fraudulent. The amount we will pay for damages 
is limited as described in Limits of Insurance." (R. 27) (emphasis on "claim" added). 
The "damages payable under th[e] policy" are the "sums that [Green] becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of [ ] property damage [ ] to which this insurance 
applies." The insurance provided by the Policy applied only "to [ ] property damage 
caused by an occurrence which takes place in the coverage territory during the policy 
period." (R. 27). 
State Farm contends that Fennell's claims do not involve property damage and 
were not caused by an occurrence. Nevertheless, when the facts, claims, allegations and 
inferences that were known to or knowable by State Farm are viewed in the light most 
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favorable to Green and coverage, it is clear they were entitled to coverage and State 
Farm was obligated to defend Green. 
A. The Landslide at the Heart of Fennell's Claims Damaged 
His Property and Fell Within the Policy's Definitions of 
Property Damage. 
In this case Green was involved with others in the preparation of property upon 
which a home would be built. That property was sold to Ivory North who had contracted 
to build Fennell a home on the property that had been prepared. In April of 1998 a 
portion of that property was involved in a landslide which significantly damaged his 
landscaping and prevented him from using a significant portion of the property he had 
purchased. 
The Policy defines property damage as "physical injury to or destruction of 
tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property." and "loss of use 
of tangible property that is not physically injured or destroyed, provided such loss of use 
is caused by physical injury to or destruction of other tangible property." (R. 40). The 
Policy does not limit the definition to personal property. It covers any property. Any 
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of coverage. Consequently, the damage to 
Fennell's real property caused by the landslide and any loss of use of his property caused 
by the destruction of his landscaping or any other physical injury to that property falls 
within State Farm's definition of property damage. The facts, circumstances and 
allegations also support a finding of property damage in this case. 
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Fennell's complaint alleged that "on April 14,1998, a landslide occurred on Lot 
31 damaging the lot and placing the home in jeopardy of damage, to plaintiff's 
substantial damage." A landslide, in and of itself, is destructive. The exact nature or 
extent of the damages caused by the landslide are not important. The Policy did not 
require any particular level of damage before its protections kicked in. The existence of 
physical injury to or destruction of physical property and any loss of use of Fennell's 
property due to damage is covered. The fact that there was property damage is 
established by Fennell's claim on Layton City for "damages incurred as a result of the 
landslides on or about the 17th day of April, 1998 and thereafter" (R. 231-232) and his 
June 11,1999 letter to Green and Wall that stated the back of Fennell' s property "started 
sliding away. As a result, the lot was substantially destroyed and the home and lot 
rendered valueless" (R. 234). Perhaps most importantly, however, is the conclusion 
reached by Linda Henrie based upon State Farm's own investigation that "no damages 
were being claimed for physical property damage to the home, however, there is 
significant damage to the plaintiffs landscaping." (R. 288) (emphasis added). That 
damage could include fences, trees, shrubs, curbing, retaining walls, sprinkler systems, 
playgrounds or any other species of landscaping installed or planted by Green. The mere 
allegations of damage and the findings of State Farm's investigation gave rise to the duty 
to defend. Even if those claims are not true, the duty to defend includes groundless, false 
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or fraudulent claims. "The question is whether the allegations, if proved, could result 
in liability under the policy." Deseret Fed. Sv., 74 P.2d at 1147. 
B. The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Relieve State Farm's 
Duty to Defend Green, but Instead Gives Rise to its 
Duty to Defend, 
In its Brief, State Farm argues that the application of the economic loss rule to 
Fennell's claims in the Fennell litigation proves there is no property damage and, 
consequently, no duty to defend. 
The determination of property damage under the economic loss rule and an 
insurance policy, however, are quite different. "The economic loss rule is a judicially 
created doctrine that marks the fundamental boundary between contract law, which 
protects expectancy interests created through agreement between the parties, and tort 
law, which protects individuals and their property from physical harm by imposing a 
duty of reasonable care." SME Ind., Inc. v. Thompson, 2001 UT 54,132, 28 P.3d 669 
(citing American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCIMech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190 
(Utah 1996)). It precludes the recovery of economic damages in negligence claims when 
there is no physical property damage or bodily injury. Id. (citations omitted). 
Economic damages that cannot be pursued in a negligence claim absent other 
physical damage are "[d]amages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement 
of the defective product, or consequential loss of profits — without any claim of personal 
injury or damage to other property ... as well as 'the diminution in the value of the 
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product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for 
'iJiJt'Ii i( \\a;> ittaniilacttiicil and soM ' hi t quoting Miiiick v. Resource Design & 
Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570,579-80 (Utah App. 1994)). Economic damages in da ins of 
the economic loss rule and construction cases refers to the work that is done by the 
contractor and includes all work encompassed within a dwelling. American Towers, 930 
I > 2d at 1191. 
The economic loss rule is intended to prevent the imposition of plaintiffs' 
economic expectations upon parties that did not deal with the plaintiffs and who were 
not involved in the creation of those economic expectations. Id. at 681 (citing American 
1 owers, 930 P.2d at 1 192; j ind ,/t lat ick, 875 1 1,2(1 at 581) Ii I: mi aiica ;. < >n the < tthci hand. 
is still intended to protect insureds from claims that are asserted against them. 
The Policy's definition of property damage includes some of the economic 
damages that are barred by the economic loss rule. The Policy defined property damage 
as "physical injur> to or desti i iction of tangible per soi ml properly" (R 27). The question , 
therefore, is whether Fennell claimed that any of his property was physically injured. If 
so, a claim for covered damages is being asserted. A landslide, as a matter of law, 
entails "ph> sical injury" to "property," It is no different than, if a truck runs off a road 
and destroys a homeowner's fence and destroys his lawn ai id shi i lbs Property is 
physically damaged. State Farm should not, therefore, be allowed to escape its duty to 
defend by arguing no property was damaged. 
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Furthermore, State Farm's reliance upon the economic loss rule unequivocally 
confirms that it recognized negligence claims covered by the Policy were being pursued 
against Green. The economic loss rule only applies to negligence cases. State Farm 
cannot credibly rely on the application of the economic loss rule for its claim of "no 
property damage" occurred, while at the same time argue that it does not have a duty to 
defend because no claims of negligence are being asserted against Green. Any dispute 
or ambiguity regarding this issue should be resolved in favor of Green. 
Finally, State Farm's claim that no property damage occurred to Fennell's 
property misreads the economic loss rule and misapplies it to the instant case. In the 
case of Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235, the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that "[w]hen an independent duty exists, the economic loss rule does not bar 
a tort claim 'because the claim is based on a recognized independent duty of care and, 
thus, does not fall within the scope of the rule.'" Id. at %ll (citing Town of Alma v. Azco 
Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1263 (Colo. 2000)). Similarly, the application of the 
economic loss rule to the instant case does not preclude Fennell's claims that Green 
breached independent extra-contractual duties of reasonable care that developers, 
subdividers, contractors and sellers of real estate owe to buyers like those imposed and 
discussed in Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, and Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55. Because 
Fennell' s claims against Green encompassed claims that Green had breached such duties, 
State Farm was obligated to defend him. 
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III. FENNELL'S CLAIMS OF NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION ALSO CONSTITUTE AN 
OCCURRENCE UNDER THE POLICY AND REQUIRED 
STATE FARM TO PROVIDE GREEN WITH A DEFENSE 
A. The Policy Covers Those Things That are Unexpected, 
Fortuitous or Not Reasonably Forseeable 
Fennell's claims of negligent misrepresentation also constitute an occurrence as 
that term is defined by the Policy. The Policy covers property damage caused by an 
occurrence. An occurrence is defined as "an accident, including continuous and repeated 
injury or property damage". One issue, therefore, is whether or not Fennell's claims 
of negligent nondisclosure can, when reviewed in the light most favorable to Green and 
insurance, be construed to be an accident. 
Utah IMS iHlopti'il t IINMII ddiii -trident h\ ;ipphm}j, Or 'less sti ict 
standard of defining 'accidental' as a result that was not reasonably foreseeable even if 
the means causing the result was foreseeable or even intentional." Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Worthington, 46F.3d 1005,1010 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Winchesterv. Prudential Life 
Ins. Co oj \im»nca c>7> I- M I 170, UK7 ( 10th Cir. 1992)). • 
When confronted with the question of what constitutes an "accident" under an 
accidental death insurance policy, the Utah Supreme Court held that "a person is a victim 
of an accident when, from the victim's point of view the occurrence causing the injury 
or death is not a natut < il • uidj wobable resi ill; of tl le victim's own acts." Hoffman v. Life 
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Ins. Co. of North Am., 669 P.2d 410,416 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). 
In a footnote the Supreme Court explained that "in the analogous area of liability 
insurance, courts have generally held that 'accident' includes results negligently caused 
by the insured. Id. at n.2 (citing 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §710 (1982); Annot, 7 ALR 
3d. 1262 (1966)). The Utah Supreme Court has also indicated that "many cases have 
held that the term 'accident' in liability insurance contracts includes results recklessly 
caused by the insured." Id. at 417 n.3 (citations omitted). Whether an act is accidental 
or not depends mostly upon the perception of the actor. Id. In this case, Green's 
perception of foreseeability is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on summary 
judgment, and should automatically give rise to State Farm's duty to defend. 
This case is not like Rosas v. Eyre, 2003 UT App. 414, 82 P.3d 185, where the 
insured claimed injuries caused when he attacked a disabled student and then pushed him 
out of his wheelchair resulted from negligent or reckless conduct. It is also quite 
different from State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1994), 
where the injuries caused by firing a loaded shotgun towards the victim were deemed to 
be the result of intentional conduct. 
In both cases the actors' intentions could be clearly inferred from the conduct 
causing the injuries. In this case, however, Fennell's claims were based on allegations 
that Green, Wall and Ivory North failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the landslide 
and advise him or others of information they needed so they could take steps to prevent 
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a landslide. Whether Green intended for the claimed damages to occur is a question of 
fact, liiat required State Farm to defend him. 
B, Claims of Negligent Misrepresentation, Like the Ones in This 
Case, Assert Claims of Negligence. 
State Farm asserts that claims of negligent misrepresentation are not entitled to 
coverage because, as a matter of law, they require the representor to intend for the harm 
to occur. State Farm Brief ai 'tis true that this Court determined that the negligent 
n lisrepresentations involved in i i le case of Nova Casualty Q i i ,; \ble Const, Inc., 1999 
UT 69, 983 P.2d 575, were not an occurrence under the representor's commercial 
general liability policy because those representations were "intentionally made with the 
purpose of inducing the actions i i •> ->u * wa Casualty, the 
sellers of tl le real proper t)/ luinniiir " promisee • * - ei& thai mere would be no 
restriction against the operation of the [buyer's] psychotherapy business [ ] from their 
home." Id. at 4. This Court determined that those representations were intentionally 
made with the purpose of inducing actions by (lie buyers tiiul Iheh was iu» coverage. 
That is significantly different from what happened in this case. 
In the Fennell litigation, this Court determined that "there were no facts presented 
to show that Green [ ] knew of a possible landslide condition on I ,ot 31." Fennell, 203 
would be impossible for Green to have intended to deceive Ivory North or Fennell. The 
lack of intent would then raise the issue of whether Green acted reasonably under the 
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circumstances. Fennell's claims based upon allegations that Green failed to act 
reasonably gave rise to a covered claim. Green's lack of knowledge would remove any 
potential claim of intentional conduct and would bring Grreen's conduct giving rise to 
Fennell's claims within State Farm's definition of an occurrence. 
Furthermore, Green and Wall sold the lot to Ivory North, which had contracted 
to build Fennell a home on that lot. There is no evidence that Green expected or should 
have expected Ivory North to construct Fennell's home without taking the precautions 
needed to prevent a landslide. The most that State Farm can claim is an inference that 
Green intended for Fennell to rely upon the lack of information on the sub-division plat 
for Falcon Ridge Phase II. The question of intent and foreseeability, however, are 
questions of fact that would give rise to, not eliminate, State Farm's duty to defend 
Green. 
C. Negligent Misrepresentation Does Not Always Require Intent 
In Robbinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App. 200,21 P.3d 219, this Court held 
that the tort of negligent misrepresentation carries a lesser mental state than fraud, 
requiring only that the seller act carelessly or negligently. Id. at 13 (citing Price-Orem 
Inv., 713 P.2d at 59) (emphasis in the original). This Court also addressed the distinct 
differences between the intent required to establish common law fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation in the case of Galloway v. Afco Dev. Corp., Ill P.2d 506 (Utah App. 
1989). It stated that: 
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The intent to deceive essential in liability for common law fraud contrasts 
with negligence. The negligent misrepresentor need not be shown to have 
any intent to deceive the victim, and he generally does not demonstrably 
know that what he says is false. The law imposes on him a duty to 
reasonably assure the accuracy of what he represents, because of a 
superior position to obtain the needed knowledge and his pecuniary 
interest in the transaction. 
Id. at 509 (citations omitted). Furthermore, in Price-Orem Inv. Co., the Utah Supreme 
Coui t noted It lat ' '%> its \ ery tern is, negligent misrepresentation does not require the 
intentional i nental state necessary to establish fraud.""' Id. at 59 n.2. Because intent is not 
necessarily a requirement of negligent misrepresentation, State Farm cannot escape its 
duty to defend simply because a claim of negligent misrepresentation is asserted. The 
fact issues regarding Green's ii itei it preclude sumn iar> judgment for State I <ai: iii, but 
make summary judgment very appropriate for Green. 
IV. STATE FARM OWED GREEN A DUTY TO INDEMNIFY 
AND DEFEND HIM UNDER THE COMPLETED 
OPERATIONS PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY THAT 
COVERED PROPERTY DAMAGE ARISING OUT OF 
PROPERTY SOLD THAT WAS GREEN'S WORK 
The Policy provided coverage for completed operatioi r i% 
"completed operations hazard" coverage included all: 
property damage arising out of your product oi your \sork except 
products that are still in your physical possession or work that has not yet 
been completed or abandoned... 
1 "1: le I \)Ii.ey defined "yen u I-I o r k " as "w ork oi opera t ions pe r fo rmed b> you oi on ;; < :>IJI 
behalf; and materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work or 
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operations," and "warranties or representations made at any time with respect to the 
fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of any of the items included in a.(l) or 
a.(2) above; and (2) the providing of or failure to provide warnings or instructions." (R. 
40-41). Under the completed operations hazard, therefore, State Farm agreed to 
indemnify and defend Green from claims arising from his work, including "any 
warranties or representations regarding fitness, quality, performance or use and for the 
failure to provide warnings or instructions." The Policy did exclude coverage for 
property damage to Green's work included in the products-completed operations hazard 
if the damage arose out of his work. That exclusion, however, did not apply if the 
damaged work or the work out of which the damage arose was performed on Green's 
behalf by a subcontractor. In the instant case, Fennell's allegations that Wall, Ivory 
North and Layton City, along with Green, were negligent in the preparation and sale of 
the property asserted covered claims that gave rise to State Farm's duty to defend. State 
Farm's failure to defend Green from those claims was a breach of its duties and entitled 
him to summary judgment. 
V. STATE FARM WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO RELY UPON THE 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES EXCLUSION OF THE POLICY 
AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT INDICATES GREEN 
EXPECTED OR INTENDED THE DAMAGES THAT 
OCCURRED IN THIS CASE. 
The key issue in this case is whether State Farm's decision to deny Green a 
defense was justified under the facts and circumstances surrounding Fennell's claims. 
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Because that decision was not based upon the professional services exclusion of the 
Policy, its attorneys should not be allowed to justify that decision by reliance upon that 
exclusion nov < . • • 
Even if State Farm could rely upon the professional services exclusion, it does not 
apply to this case. While exclusion discussed various types of professional services 
(including legal, accounting, advertising, engineering, drafting, preparation of plans, 
n ledical ser vices, moi ti iar> 01 vete rinary services, chiropractic services and 
pharmaceutical services) (R.30), it did not define "professional services". The categories 
of services covered by the exclusion do not include contracting, construction, lot 
preparation 01 evaluatioi lorai lytl ling else Green Did Accepting State Farm's argun lent 
that professional services are those things that require judgment would totally annihilate 
and eliminate any purpose for or protections of Green's contractors Policy. Furthermore, 
allowing the professional services exclusion to cover the acts and damages at the heart 
of I 'ennell's claims w 01 ilci allow anii isiii: ai lcecompai i/y to refuse to insure ai ly act based 
on the insured's opinion and judgment. The application of the professional services 
exclusion to the facts of this case is not consistent with the purposes or coverages 
provided by the Policy and should not be recognized by the Court. 
Theexclusioi 1 that pi ech ides coverage f<" linages expected 01 i ntendedfi on ithe 
standpoint of the insured, is also inapplicable to this case. As pointed out above, there 
is no evidence that Green expected or intended for a landslide to occur on Fennell's lot. 
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In fact, all the evidence before this Court conflicts with such a finding. While an 
inference might be able to be made, Green's state of mind that lead him to act or not to 
act is a question of fact that precludes summary judgment for State Farm but entirely 
appropriate for Green. 
VI. WHILE THE POLICY WAS NOT PURCHASED TO COVER 
CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT IT WAS 
PURCHASED TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR MISTAKES 
AND INADVERTENCE BY GREEN AND THOSE WITH 
WHOM HE WAS WORKING. 
In order to determine whether there is coverage, or more importantly in this case, 
a duty to defend, the courts need to look at whether the actions complained of constitutes 
an occurrence under the policy. While a contractor's election to install pine cabinetry 
instead of walnut cabinetry would not likely qualify as an accident, the inadvertent 
failure to properly weld an iron truss, resulting in the collapse of a building would likely 
be inadvertent, unforeseeable and an accident entitled to coverage. The differences 
between contract claims and negligence claims are sufficiently dealt with by the 
economic loss doctrine. To hold that all property damage arising out of faulty 
construction work is nothing more than a breach of contract misses important 
characteristics of the construction industry and the intent behind insurance policies 
issued to that industry. 
In Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 298 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1962), the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that not all claims involving breach of warranty or 
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negligence prevent them from being an accident. That case recognized that a 
contractor's liability polic> should pi otect hii i i ft on i foi !:i litous losses occun ii lg in 
connection with his work. Property damage due to a mistake or carelessness by the 
contractor, his employees, or his subcontractors, as occurred in this case, should be 
covered. Insurance companies are in the business of distributing losses so that fortuitous 
nilstak.es can be co\ ered and coiiti actors can stay in business 
In Federated Mutual Ins. Co. v. Grapevine Excavation, Inc., 197 F.3d 720 (5th 
Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals carefully and fully analyzed the differences 
between breaches of contract and inadvertent mistakes. 11 held that consequences of 
inadv ertent coiislnirlion drftvts (even when Ihrv ennsliliilt1 a bivarli of eoiilnuli are 
accidental and are entitled to coverage. Id. at 729-30. The facts that there never was 
a contract between Green and Fennell and the actions underlying Fennell's claims were 
inadvertent at best should bring his claims within the coverage of State Farm's policy, 
ai id require it to defend Green. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECOGNIZED GREEN'S 
FACTUAL ASSERTIONS WHEN IT GRANTED GREEN'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
State Farm argues that Green's failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of 
Rule 7(c)(3)(B), I Jtal I R Civ. I " , si 101 ilci have pi evei ited tl le Coi irt froi n gi anting 
Summary Judgn lei it for Green I lie I Jtal i Supreme Court, however, has indicated that 
where an 
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opposing memorandum [does] not set forth disputed facts listed in 
numbered sentences in a separate section as required [by the rule, as long 
as] the disputed facts [are] clearly provided in the body of the 
memorandum with applicable record references,... failure to comply with 
the technical requirements of rule 4-501 (2)(B) [is] harmless. 
Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, f 23 n. 2, 89, P.3d 155. See 
also Johnson v. Dept ofTransp., 2004 UT App 284, f 7 n . 2 , 98 P.3d 773; and Gary 
Porter Const v. Fox Const, Inc., 2004 UT 354, f 15, 101 P.3d 371. 
Green's Memoranda in this case did not dispute State Farm's alleged facts, but 
did explain why those facts were not sufficient to provide a legal basis for summary 
judgment. Green then provided the trial court with additional facts, explanations, 
citations to this Court's decision in FennelU and other evidentiary support demonstrating 
that Green was entitled to summary judgment. (R. 176-80; 197-252; 270-96). In this 
case, the mere existence of material questions of fact gave rise to State Farm's duty to 
defend Green, and entitled Green to summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above this Court should uphold the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment to Green declaring that Slate Farm had a duty and an 
obligation to defend Green and that State Farm's failure to do so was a bad faith breach 
of the obligations it owed to Green. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^V day of March, 2005. 
S(1 U ,LE^& READING, i"' I 
Steven B. Smith 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Edward D. Green and 
Ed Green Construction I in 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES, EDWARD B. GREEN AND FD GREEN 
CONSTRUCTION, INC, were served upon counsel of record at tin* addresses listed 
below by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage pre-paid on 
day of March, 2005. 
David N. Mortensen 
R. Phil Ivie 
IVIE & YOUNG 
226 West 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
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ADDENDUM 
Minute Entry Signed August 6, 2004 declaring Green is entitled to 
Summary Judgment regarding State Farm's dnf\ to defend 
(R. 297-98) 
Order granting Green's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying 
State Farm's Motion for Summai idgment 
(R. 3()oni) 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
EDWARD D. GREEN, an individual 
and ED GREEN CONSTRUCTION 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Illinois 
corporation; and STATE FARM 




CASE NO. 020902692' 
JUDilTC MTKPHEN J... HENR I i Hi 
This matter is before the above entitled Court on the parties' 
cross motions for summary judgment. Oral arguments were heard on 
May 10, 2004, at. 9:00 a.m nclusion of arguments, the 
Court took the matter under advisement. Now, having reviewed the 
parties' arguments along with the relevant legal authorities the 
Court rules as stated herein. 
The real issue before this Court is not a determination of 
liability, but an analysis of the protections extended by State 
Farm to Ed Green via the terms of the parties' insurance contract. 
In this case, the Court finds that State Farm's duty to defend is 
much broader than its duty to indemnify. Accordingly, because 
Fennell's complaint includes claims which could potentially trigger 
GREEN V. STATE FARM PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
coverage under the policy, State Farm is obligated to reimburse Mr 
Green for his costs, expenses, losses, injuries and damages 
resulting from its failure to provide a defense in the case of 
James Fenell v Ed Green et. al. 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
Defendants1 motion for summary judgment denied. Plaintiff's 
counsel to prepare an Order consistent with this Minute Entry. 
Dated this (j day of Jj*£y, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing M1NUTK KNTRY', I o I he following, this °\ Day 
of
 (XLU\ > 2004: 
David Mortensen 
Ivie & Young 
226 West 2230 North, Suite 110 
PO Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Steven B Smith 
Scally & Reading 
50 South Main Street, Suite 950 
PO Box 11429 
Salt*'Lake City, Utah 84147 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Steven B. Smith, (#5797) 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 950 
P.O. Box 11429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
Facsimile: (801) 531-7968 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD D. GREEN, an individual, and ED 




STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation; and 
STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020902692 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Edward D. Green and Ed Green 
Construction, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Green") and Defendants' State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Company and State Farm General Insurance Company (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "State Farm") cross motions for summary judgment regarding Defendants' duty to defend 
Plaintiffs from claims asserted by James Fennel. The matter was fully briefed and was orally argued 
on May 10, 2004. The Court took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued a minute 
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entry. Being fully advised and based upon the arguments of counsel and the law, the Court now 
finds and rules as follows: 
The question presented by this case is whether State Farm had a duty to defend Green from 
the claims asserted by James Fennel. Green's liability for Fennel's claims is not an issue in this case. 
State Farm's duty tc defend is broader than its duty to indemnify. 
Fennel's Complaint asserts claims which could potentially trigger coverage under the policy. 
State Farm's refusal to provide Green with a defense was a violation of its duty to defend and 
it, therefore, is obligated to reimburse Green for his costs, expenses, losses, injuries and damages 
resulting from its failure to provide a defense in the case of James Fennel v. Ed Green, et. al. 
Because State Farm was obligated to defend Green it is, therefore, ordered that Green's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
denied. 
DATED this j ^ f . day of /IrUfU CJ^ 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
District Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David N. Mortensen 
Attorney for Defendants 
i 
Jude 
